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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Sherwin is a contrarian and a skeptic. Surveying the
doctrine and practice of legal compensation for wrongs—principally
within tort law—she does not especially like what she sees.1 Defenders
of the system offer principles that do not readily explain the actual
practice. In a variety of ways, she points out, so-called compensation
often is not really an accurate measure of what is required to make the
victim whole. And then she draws a rather startling conclusion. In
reality, compensatory “justice” is based partly on revenge, on giving the
victims of legal wrongs some satisfaction at the expense of their injurers.
And such revenge is not a virtuous emotion or justification. So if you
are a corrective justice maven, she says, don’t be so smug. You’ve got
some serious explaining to do.
This Commentary takes up her challenge. I will suggest that
* M.L. Sykes Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
1. See Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387,
1388 (2003).
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nonconsequentialist accounts of tort doctrine have much more explanatory
power than she suggests and that the supposed fact that many tort
victims act from vengeful motives has less. At the same time, her
revenge interpretation does have value in illuminating some aspects of
tort doctrine.
Let us begin with a closer look at Sherwin’s argument. The first part
of her paper describes some important discordances between compensation
practice and the supposed goals of compensation. Often, she points out,
actual compensation practice does not properly compensate—either
because it undercompensates, because it overcompensates, or because it
purports to compensate for things or conditions that cannot be restored
or made whole.2
Undercompensation occurs when losses are excluded because they are
too unforeseeable or remote, when plaintiffs are precluded from recovering
the costs of litigation, when wrongful death statutes arbitrarily cap
recovery, and in other situations. Overcompensation occurs when damages
greatly exceed what the victim would voluntarily accept in order to
suffer the harm (for example, for harm to dignitary interests and for
violations of civil rights), and when benefits conferred by the injurer are
not deducted. (Her examples include the collateral source rule, the
award of loss of consortium damages even when the spouse of a
deceased victim remarries, and the policy of not informing the jury that
the victim’s award is not taxed.)3
Finally, Sherwin identifies a category of “immeasurable losses,” which
money cannot replace, and she notes that compensation is nevertheless
often awarded for such losses—for sensory and emotional harm, pain and
suffering, harm to reputation, and harm to personal relationships.
Awarding compensation here is problematic, she suggests. First, the
criteria employed are very unscientific: Juries are often merely asked to
award a “reasonable” sum. Second, and more fundamentally, the victim
would accept no amount of money for serious injury or death.4
What do these multiple discordances suggest? Although Sherwin
concedes that policies other than compensation, and pragmatic difficulties,
explain some of the discrepancies, she believes that not all of them can
be so rationalized. Rather, the examples show that compensatory remedies
are not exclusively devoted to loss adjustment, even in cases where no
competing goals are evident. Instead, courts also provide claimants with
a sense of satisfaction that justice has been done—and “justice” in the
sense not of corrective justice, but of evening the score. The basic
2.
3.
4.
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practice of compensation lets the victim not only regain lost ground, but
regain it at the injurer’s expense. Thus, Sherwin thinks, an element of
revenge must explain tort’s compensation practice.
Let me suggest three sets of responses to Professor Sherwin’s
provocative analysis.5
II. NONCONSEQUENTIALIST ACCOUNTS OF TORT DOCTRINE ARE
MORE FECUND THAN SHERWIN SUGGESTS
Sherwin’s analysis seems to betray a misunderstanding of corrective
justice and other nonconsequentialist rationales for tort doctrine. Such
rationales do not focus exclusively on the victim’s need for compensation.
Accordingly, it does not follow that some other rationale—revenge—is
needed to explain the structure of tort law.
Most corrective justice and other nonconsequentialist tort scholars
insist on a close linkage between the victim’s right and the injurer’s duty.
They think that the injurer has an obligation to the victim to restore the
victim’s position. To be sure, they sometimes differ sharply about the
nature of the required linkage. But there is broad agreement that a linkage
is required. It is not enough just to show the social desirability of
compensating the victim, on the one hand, and the desirability of having
the injurer pay for the harm he has done, on the other.6 If this were
enough, we could imagine many different social arrangements other than
tort law that would serve these purposes, such as government no-fault
insurance or risk premiums assessed against members of an industry.
Similarly, Sherwin complains that corrective justice cannot fully
explain why an injurer must pay the victim for his loss; often, she points
5. I also believe that tort goals and policies other than compensation, and
pragmatic and institutional constraints, are more potent than Sherwin suggests in
explaining the various discordances she describes in her article.
6. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 134–35 (1995)
(arguing that the defendant must have breached a duty correlative to the plaintiff’s right);
Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273,
276 (1996) (discussing this structural feature of corrective justice accounts). In his
earlier work, Jules Coleman did suggest that compensation and payment might be
disconnected and still comport with corrective justice. See, e.g., Jules Coleman,
Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 422–27 (1982). However,
he has since substantially changed his view. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS
365–71 (1992) (describing a “mixed” conception of corrective justice); see also Kenneth
W. Simons, Jules Coleman and Corrective Justice in Tort Law: A Critique and
Reformulation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 851–56 (1992) [hereinafter Simons, Jules
Coleman] (discussing Coleman’s new “mixed” conception of justice).
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out, the outcome was highly improbable at the time the injurer acted.
But again, she understates the justificatory power of nonconsequentialist
tort theory, which indeed can explain why the award of damages for
harm caused is a just remedy even if the injurer has created only a small,
but still unjustifiable, risk of harm.7
Another example of Sherwin’s insufficient appreciation of
nonconsequentialist principles comes late in the paper. Having concluded
that vengeance plays a surprisingly important role in explaining both the
motivation of litigants and the tort system itself, Sherwin asserts that the
pursuit of vengeance in this form is more a vice than a virtue. Staterecognized retribution (through the criminal law), she concedes, is
arguably a moral good. However, the form of revenge that tort litigants
display is more akin to a private vendetta and is thus at best excusable
(for example, as a private outlet for emotions). Why is revenge a more
legitimate consideration in criminal law than in tort law? According to
Sherwin, state retribution focuses on the actor’s absolute desert; by
contrast, informal revenge is based on personal grievance, on a loss that
need not be caused by blameworthy conduct, and on a desire for
comparative mastery over the injurer.8
Again, however, this analysis understates the resources of corrective
justice and fairness accounts. Even if providing the victim with a right
to recover damages from an injurer is properly described as a form of
“retaliation,” it is a highly constrained form of retaliation, similar in
this respect to the criminal law’s punishment of an offender in
accordance with his just deserts. Just as criminal law constrains the
retributive urges, so does tort law by permitting recovery only if the
victim proves that the injurer violated a standard of care, that this breach
caused specific types of damages, and so forth.9 (Also, apart from
punitive damage cases, evidence of the injurer’s wealth is normally
excluded.) Why, then, is the legally constrained “retaliation” achieved
in tort law not also a moral good?10
7. These reasons include the following: (1) ex ante, it is fair to require the
defendant to pay for even a small risk of loss, if that risk is unjustifiable, because his
default will only require payment in a correspondingly small proportion of cases; (2) the
alternative of requiring compensation for risk creation (whether or not harm results) is
ordinarily very costly and often infeasible.
8. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 1409–11.
9. On the other hand, one difference that supports Sherwin’s argument is the
following: Most criminal law criteria are pretty clearly defined, while the tort standard of
negligence is relatively open-ended, perhaps permitting jury recourse to “retaliatory” impulses.
10. Sherwin does identify a special problem with tort law: The injurer might not
have committed a moral wrong. Again, however, she understates the ability of
nonconsequentialist accounts of tort law to account for strict liability doctrine. See, e.g.,
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 544–51
(1972) (offering a “nonreciprocal risk” justification for strict liability); Simons, Jules
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III. DO SOME TORT DOCTRINES SUPPORT THE REVENGE
INTERPRETATION?
Even if we reject Sherwin’s broader claims about the failure of
nonconsequentialist accounts to justify tort doctrine and practice, it is
worth looking more closely at certain doctrines that might lend some
support to her revenge interpretation. Consider the law of damages,
including pain and suffering and hedonic damages.
With respect to pain and suffering, Sherwin repeats two common
criticisms: The criteria for measurement are extraordinarily vague, and
in any event, victims would not accept any amount of money for serious
injury or death. Instead, she suggests, variations in pain and suffering
damages often reflect variations in injurer culpability as much as
variations in the extent of the loss.11 Indeed, given that these harms are
immeasurable and irreparable, the award of damages can be viewed as a
vehicle for the transfer of wealth (and, thereby, status) from wrongdoers
to victims. Thus, Sherwin claims, the practice of awarding pain and
suffering damages supports her retaliation interpretation.
These last observations are creative and interesting. However, I believe
that awards for pain and suffering can, to some extent, be justified on
more conventional grounds. Although few victims would accept any
sum in exchange for serious injury or death, many would (and do) accept
money or some other benefit in exchange for accepting a risk of injury
or death. To be sure, it does not then follow that compensatory justice is
satisfied by providing damages in the amount of whatever sum a
particular victim or class of victims would (or did) accept. Whether this
is the proper criterion depends on a particularized account of welfare,
value, or protected human interests. And the selection of such an
account in turn depends on the underlying nonconsequentialist theory.12
Once more, Sherwin seems to assume that corrective justice and other
fairness-based theories cannot explain whether and how tort law should
compensate for intangible and irreparable harms. But any complete
theory must address such issues. Relevant distinctions might be drawn
along numerous dimensions, including: physical, emotional, or
economic harm; expectation or reliance; harm or loss of a benefit;
Coleman, supra note 6, at 875–81 (suggesting that corrective justice might support two
strict liability categories: conditional fault and nonfault).
11. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 1404.
12. For one such account, see generally Stephen R. Perry, Protected Interests and
Undertakings in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247 (1992).
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subjective or objective valuation of a loss; and ex ante or ex post
measures of restoration.
Consider, for example, the question whether damages should be
awarded to a comatose person for the loss of sensation or pleasures.
Should such damages be more or less than the damages owed to a
conscious person who is aware of her loss of the same sensations or
pleasures? On the one hand, the latter at least possesses consciousness.
On the other, she is also aware of her loss, as the former is not.13 Only
an account of the kinds of interests that the law should protect can
answer such questions. An appeal to the revenge interpretation is not
illuminating here.
However, Sherwin is more persuasive when she turns to punitive
damages. She plausibly argues that the availability of such damages is
better explained as serving the victim’s interest in imposing private
punishment than as improving deterrence.14 Indeed, she might emphasize
that an award of punitive damages requires some aggravated form of
fault, such as recklessness or willful conduct. This requirement supports
her general thesis: Additional damages are permitted in just those cases
where the retaliatory impulse is understandably the strongest.
Moreover, the revenge interpretation sheds more light on another
doctrine that Sherwin mentions only in passing—hedonic damages.
Corrective justice has some difficulty justifying the award of damages
for the lost pleasures of living in cases where the victim dies and is not
survived by family members. In such a case, who deserves compensation?
And similarly, even when the victim leaves survivors, do they deserve as
an element of damages his lost pleasures of living, over and above their
own personal economic and emotional losses? Practical and standing
difficulties partly explain this lacuna in the law of damages. And some
fairness-based theorists might try to affirmatively justify noncompensation
here (though this raises the usual objection against permitting an injurer
to be better off for killing a victim than for seriously injuring her). But
perhaps the retaliation interpretation is also a partial explanation for
nonrecovery for such hedonic damages. After all, the retributive sentiment
will normally be weaker when the immediate victim is not even
conscious of her loss.
Finally, Sherwin aptly observes that the current compensation system
supports individual suits by victims against injurers but does not endorse
recovery from a risk pool (into which all tortious potential injurers have

13. Courts are split on this question. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1052
(2000) (collecting cases).
14. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 1402.
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contributed).15 Of course, high administrative costs would make the latter
approach impractical in all but a few cases. Still, she is correct that her
revenge interpretation supports the tort law’s endorsement of the
traditional approach, which provides the victim with a sense of satisfaction
from pursuing the actual injurer. Whatever arguments of fairness one might
offer for the pooling approach,16 victims are less likely to feel personally
vindicated under that approach. Another illustration of Sherwin’s point is the
states’ experiences with no-fault automobile legislation. Notwithstanding
the high hopes of no-fault advocates, the public seems to care a great
deal about retaining the fault system in all but the most minor accidents,
even at the expense of significantly higher insurance premiums.17
IV. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LITIGATION
Sherwin’s revenge interpretation also includes a phenomenological
claim about the motives of legal actors seeking compensation.
Corrective justice, she asserts, cannot explain the aggressive sentiments
often accompanying claims to compensation. Victims do not just want
to recover for losses; they wish to “prevail over their injurers.” (Indeed,
with a melodramatic flourish, she suggests that victims “stalk” their
injurers.)18
This phenomenological claim is intriguing but inadequately developed.
In the first place, it is ambiguous. Is it a claim about the reasons why
victims participate in the system? About the tangible or intangible
benefits they expect to obtain at the end? More empirical support would
be helpful here.
Moreover, if this is a factual claim, the obvious next question is why,
or even whether, these facts matter. Why should we care why litigants
use the legal system? And why should we expect corrective justice (or
any other justificatory theory) to “explain” the phenomenology of litigation?
More needs to be said here. If our tort system is adequately justified by
15. Id. at 1400–01.
16. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing
Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 460–69 (1990) (arguing that corrective justice supports
such a risk pool); Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for RiskCreation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 113, 118–20 (1990) (agreeing in part).
17. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 242–48
(2d ed. 2002) (noting that legislatures have been reluctant to abolish tort liability for
automobile accidents entirely). Plaintiffs’ tort lawyers no doubt have also discouraged
the development of no-fault systems.
18. Sherwin, supra note 1, at 1397.
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principles of efficiency, or corrective justice, or transactional or
distributive justice, should it matter that litigants have their own distinct
motives for using the system, even if the motives seem to be in tension
with those principles?
On the other hand, it is indeed plausible to believe that the underlying
justifications for the legal system should pay some heed to the
motivation of actors who use the system. The necessity of some such
connection is most clear under an efficiency theory. For if the tort system is
to give injurers appropriate incentives to take due care, then it is relevant
whether and how often victims use the legal system.19 Also, insofar as
the efficient state of affairs being sought assumes a utilitarian calculus
that counts the satisfaction of the preferences of participants, the
satisfaction of the victims’ desire for revenge has positive social value.
It is less clear how nonconsequentialist theories take into account the
motives of victim litigants (vengeful or otherwise). At the very least,
such theories must be perceived as legitimate, but this alone imposes
only a very weak constraint on the content of the principles. Almost
any coherent approach to compensation satisfies this criterion, even if
the approach does little or nothing to satisfy the supposed preferences
of victims for revenge.
However, there is another way to understand Sherwin’s emphasis on
the phenomenology of litigation. The “prevailing over the injurer” story
might be an account of how the legal system—or at least an important
part of the legal system—understands itself. The jury plays a vital role
in tort cases. And it is possible that the arguments that really matter to
jurors are those based on revenge, rather than corrective justice (insofar
as these genuinely differ). Some support for this view can be found in
Neal Feigenson’s recent book.20 Reviewing the literature on jury
decisionmaking in tort cases, Feigenson suggests that juries very often
try to do “total justice.” That is, they “strive to square all accounts
between the parties [and] reach a decision that is correct as a whole,”
sometimes in disregard of the technical legal standards.21 And revenge,
or something closely akin to it, often plays a vital role. “[P]eople tend to
conceive of accidents as melodramas and the doing of justice as the
righting of an imbalance (or the distribution of accident costs) between
the good guy(s) and the bad guy(s).”22 Also, insofar as negligence
19. Of course, whether vengeful motives actually do promote efficiency depends
on whether they encourage victims to sue at an optimal rate or instead too often (or too
infrequently).
20. See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT
ACCIDENTS (2000).
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id. at 13.
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doctrine itself often relies heavily on the judgment of an individual jury
about what constitutes “reasonable care,” rather than on a preexisting
judicial or legislative criterion, juries are relatively free to rely on
retributive sentiments in deciding whether the injurer has acted
tortiously.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Sherwin’s mischievous claim, that compensatory remedies
actually rest in part on vengeance, will strike some readers as hyperbolic
or even absurd. Torts are not crimes. And compensation is not
punishment.
But Sherwin succeeds in demonstrating some complexities and
contradictions in the legal institution of remedial compensation. Although
she underestimates the power of nonconsequentialist principles to
explain and justify that institution, and is too quick to assume that the
vengeful motives of some litigants bear on such an explanation or
justification, her unorthodox excavation does reveal trace elements of
retribution. It is an interesting find, well worth pondering.
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